Because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an unsigned document that doesn’t impose any real obligations on the U.S., the Trump administration will be able to jettison it without formally reneging on American commitments, argues Amir Taheri:

President Trump [will have] a number of options. He could demand that Tehran formally and officially accept Security Council Resolution 2231 [which affirmed the deal by abrogating six previous Security Council resolutions meant to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and which Iran has until recently condemned]. Articles 11 and 12 of the resolution enable any member of the Security Council to bring a case alleging non-compliance by Iran. That would trigger the so-called snap-back process under which the council would have to review the whole situation again and come up with a new decision within 30 days. If there is no accord after 30 days, the six previous resolutions would be re-activated with suspended sanctions re-imposed by all UN members. . . .

Trump’s other option is to do nothing unless the mullahs do something specific and verifiable regarding their nuclear program. And doing nothing includes not extending Obama’s suspension of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Obama specialized in giving “gifts” to America’s enemies without even asking for anything in return.

Trump should show that the U.S. is no longer in the business of giving something for nothing. As a businessman he could practice give-and-take diplomacy; if the mullahs really freeze their nuclear program, then sanctions imposed on them with regard to that issue could and should be suspended in a just and proportionate way. . . . After eight years, America’s friends and foes may resume treating the U.S. with respect as a power that does not build its diplomacy on trompe-l’oeil motifs.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.