After consolidating their reconquest of the eastern half of Mosul from Islamic State (IS), Iraqi forces have now crossed the Tigris and begun the battle for the western part of the city. Victory is near-certain for Iraq and its allies, writes Amir Taheri, but what follows it may prove more dangerous:

[S]taring at impending defeat, the hard-core IS fighters will retreat to Syria where they could retrench and remain in their deadly business for months, if not years. From its very beginning, IS has had an implicit non-aggression pact with the Syrian regime and its Iranian-backers. . . . In recent months, [this] arrangement . . . has been extended to include Russia as well. The Russia-Iran-Assad entente is likely to remain focused on fighting non-IS anti-regime groups, allowing IS to maintain a presence in Syria. . . .

[Meanwhile], the various Shiite armed groups that have taken part in . . . the battle are determined to claim as big a share as they can. If they bite off a bigger morsel than they deserve, they could transform the end of the war into a recipe for revanchism by the humiliated Sunni population. That sentiment could be deepened if the Islamic Republic in Tehran tries to grab a bigger share [for itself].

[But the real question is]: in whose name will victory in Mosul be claimed? Winning the war against IS in the name of Iraq as a united nation-state is one thing, winning it in the name of a coalition of disparate and at times even antagonistic ethnic and sectarian forces is quite another.

It may not be exaggerated to suggest that the right victory in Mosul could mark the rebirth of Iraq as a nation-state while the wrong victory could spell the end of Iraq as a unified entity. . . . Any “after-Mosul” strategy . . . must also include plans to weave Iraq’s Sunni community back into the fabric of national politics by granting them a genuine share of power and a clear vision for a future in dignity. And that, of course, cannot be done if the central power in Baghdad is atrophied by corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.