On Monday, Hamas released a new manifesto that downplays some of the organization’s most incendiary anti-Semitic views; on Wednesday, the Palestinian Authority’s president was welcomed warmly by the White House. Michael Koplow contrasts the two events:

The domestic political benefits of [the visit] for Abbas cannot be overstated, as he will get to coast on the afterglow of being treated as an honored guest by President Trump rather than as an afterthought. Not only that, Abbas had a White House platform to emphasize all of the core Palestinian positions—a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with east Jerusalem as its capital—while getting an unexpected bonus from Trump as he extolled the virtues of Palestinian security cooperation with Israel. . . . As things stand now, there are few things Abbas could do that would give him more breathing room at home.

As for Hamas:

The new policy of accepting a provisional Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without giving up the larger fight for the entire land between the river and the sea, and purposely leaving out [of the manifesto] any mention of Hamas’s Muslim Brotherhood origins and ties, is aimed solely at external actors. . . . The question is whether these moves will fool anyone, as they do not represent real change within Hamas but are akin to putting lipstick on a pig. . . . Hamas’s continued terrorism will not be overridden by a change in rhetoric away from demonizing Jews to demonizing only “Zionist war criminals,” particularly when its odious anti-Semitic charter is still in full effect. Hamas also runs a real risk that this [rhetorical shift] will further weaken it at home, as its resistance credentials can now be called into question by even more intransigent actors, and indeed it is no accident that the rollout of the new document took place in Doha rather than in Gaza.

Those who already support Hamas are unlikely to be happy with the new changes, no matter how illusory they are, and those who don’t are unlikely to be convinced that this represents a new and improved movement.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.