In accordance with legislation that accompanied the 2015 agreement, the U.S. president must decide every 90 days whether to “recertify” that the Islamic Republic is complying with its terms or to declare it in violation. After reportedly vigorous debate among his senior advisers, President Trump opted on Monday to recertify for the second time in his term. The White House argues that more time is needed to study the question and formulate new policy before blowing up the entire deal by declaring Iran in violation. But the editors of the Weekly Standard argue that time is short:

Iran is not, in fact, complying with the agreement. As Senators Tom Cotton, Ted Cruz, David Perdue, and Marco Rubio pointed out in a letter to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson last week, the Iranian regime has exceeded the number of uranium-enrichment centrifuges and levels of heavy-water production it’s permitted under the agreement; it’s aggressively trying to attain nuclear and missile technology outside the terms of the deal; and it’s refusing to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear operations. . . .

Administration officials tell us that this recertification is pro forma, a congressionally mandated box-checking that buys the White House time to complete a comprehensive policy review. The real debate about Iran policy continues. Fair enough, but we strongly suspect the same reasons for keeping up the conceit will exist 90 days from now, when the next recertification is due.

Secretary Tillerson has said his goal is a new deal, or at least significant provisions to strengthen the existing one. But it’s unclear how the Trump administration, having paraded its “America First” foreign policy throughout Europe in recent weeks, will convince other parties to the Iran deal—some of whom have strong economic [and, in Russia’s case, military] ties to Tehran—to sign up for an Iran deal, Part Two.

Donald Trump was engaging in a bit of campaign hyperbole when he promised to make dismantling the Iran deal his first order of business as president. The longer he waits to formulate a comprehensive Iran policy, the more likely it is that Iran will become that top priority on its own.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.