The 2015 nuclear deal—known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—ended a number of sanctions on Iranian aviation, allowing Tehran to upgrade and expand its fleet of planes and related facilities. On average, eleven flights every week—mostly on ostensibly commercial airlines—now leave the Islamic Republic for Syria bearing arms, supplies, and soldiers to support Bashar al-Assad against his enemies. Iran will continue buying new parts and aircraft unless President Trump takes action. But doing so, explains Emanuele Ottolenghi, presents him with a dilemma:

Given the Iranian civil-aviation industry’s involvement in the Syrian airlift, it is in the interest of the U.S. to impose sanctions on that industry to prevent Iran from exploiting global commerce to aid its illicit activities. But, simultaneously, the end of longstanding U.S. aviation sanctions against Iran has opened the potentially lucrative Iranian market to U.S. manufacturers. Boeing insists that its $16.6-billion deal with Iran Air, and possible future deals between the U.S. aviation industry and other Iranian airlines, means that tens of thousands of U.S. jobs are now at stake. . . . [In actual fact, however,] Boeing has been outsourcing jobs overseas and laying off people as its assembly lines increasingly use automation to fulfill orders.

A multibillion-dollar business transaction is a powerful incentive against any re-imposition of sanctions. It also proves the hollowness of the argument made by JCPOA advocates in 2015 that the sanctions’ snapback mechanism would insulate the deal from Iranian cheating. The economic stakes make it much harder for any administration to reimpose sanctions on the strength of any but the most egregious violations. . . .

Proving Iran Air’s participation in a military airlift on behalf of [its military’s expeditionary wing], the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose goal is to sustain the Syrian slaughter and arm Hizballah, would make the airline eligible for renewed sanctions. Renewed sanctions would kill the big business deals signed with Iran Air and likely would trigger a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the entire 2015 agreement. . . .

U.S. reluctance to look into the mounting evidence of the Iranian aviation sector’s collusion with the Assad regime has only further emboldened the country at a time when the JCPOA has given its leaders additional financial resources to pursue their regional hegemonic ambitions. And this is one more reason why the Trump administration should suspend licensing for aircraft deals with Iranian commercial carriers while it conducts a thorough review of their role in the airlifts to Syria.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.