One week ago, Lokman Slim—a Lebanese writer, publisher, and activist—was found shot dead in his car, undoubtedly murdered by operatives of the Iran-backed Hizballah terrorist group. Alberto M. Fernandez, who met Slim while serving as an American diplomat in the Middle East, remembers him as a man who “combined three extremely powerful, rare, and—for Hizballah—dangerous personal attributes: he was a man who could not be bought; he was a man without fear; and he was a man with something to say.” Moreover, writes Fernandez, there is much the West can learn from Slim’s life:

As Lebanon descended in 2019 into more or less permanent political and economic crisis and many took to the streets to demonstrate against intolerable conditions, Lokman was there and some of [his Western friends] were concerned about his exposure. . . . In typical fashion, instead of thinking how to hide, he offered up half a dozen great to wild ideas about how to help the thawra [as Lebanese called their grassroots struggle for change] to flourish and grow.

But there was no real appetite in Washington for such activities. These were ideas that a West that was as committed to its supposed ideals as much as Iran and the Salafi jihadists are to theirs would have embraced. But that world seems to have passed, if it ever really existed.

Those who see Lokman as some sort of Western proxy are completely mistaken. His was a singular struggle with much more consistency, principle, and honesty than that shown by a West seemingly distracted and full of doubt about itself and its place in the world, a West tired of striving and eager to embrace any sort of regional hegemon that will relieve us of working and trying too hard.

In a better world, the “international community” would be rushing to embrace Lokman’s struggle and that of his colleagues in the days ahead. I don’t see either Europe or Biden’s America having that sort of moral clarity.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.