The last time elections were held for the Palestinian Legislative Council—the Palestinian Authority’s parliament—was 2016, and the result was a victory for Hamas. A brief civil war subsequently broke out in the Gaza Strip between Hamas and its rival Fatah, leading to Hamas’s control of the territory. Recently, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which remains under Fatah’s control, set a date for new elections in May. Michael Milstein analyzes whether they will happen, and the possible results:

Today, the Palestinians find themselves at the closest point to holding an election since 2006, arriving here after a decade and half of repeated failures in efforts at internal reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. [But the chances] that this election will really take place remains foggy. And even if it does happen, there is the growing sense that it would redound more to the reputation of Hamas than that of Fatah. As such, the prospect of an election will probably face new challenges and even threats from the PA, Israel, and to a great extent the moderate Arab camp and the West as well.

Therefore, looking ahead, it is already vital to establish close consultation and coordination regarding this election among all of the following: Israel, the PA, the main Arab actors—especially Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—and the international community, with the United States in the lead. Without this concerted effort, we are all likely to witness a replay of the 2006 election, a process that will dramatically alter the very nature of Palestinian affairs by weakening the nationalist trend and strengthening the Islamist one under the leadership of Hamas.

The best, most urgent way to avoid repeating that tragic mistake today would be . . . to stipulate that Hamas could participate in the election only after it convincingly accepts the conditions previously agreed to by Israel, the PA, the United States, . . . Russia, the EU, and the UN. That means recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and accepting all previous Palestinian-Israeli political agreements. And if Hamas continues to refuse, then it must bear the onus of aborting the first Palestinian election in fifteen years.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.