Last week, a meeting of OPEC and affiliated oil-exporting countries broke up without reaching an agreement, following a dispute between Saudi Arabia, which wants to reduce production, and the United Arab Emirates, which wants to increase it. The two neighboring states are closely aligned, and the dispute threatens not only OPEC, but also the loose coalition of pro-Western Arab states that they lead. Bobby Ghosh cautions against reading too much into the recent blowup:

The Middle East’s most meaningful alliance has endured territorial disputes, succession crises and the pressures of war in the neighborhood. . . . It will survive because the two Gulf Arab countries have many common interests, especially in the spheres of geopolitics and security: they both are threatened by Iran and its proxies, are wary of Turkey’s growing influence in the region, and fear the political Islam propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots. Their de-facto rulers, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed, have a close personal friendship.

Faced with the twin foreign-policy challenges of the rising Iranian menace to the Middle East and the U.S. retrenchment from the region, the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE know they can’t let their differences get out of hand. . . . With a bipartisan consensus developing in Washington for letting the Arab states reach their own accommodation with Tehran, the Emiratis and Saudis need to hang together or be hung out to dry separately.

Opposition to Iran also keeps the UAE—the most important of the countries that last year normalized relations with Jerusalem—and Saudi Arabia aligned with Israel.

Last week, the Lebanese parliament chose Joseph Aoun to be the country’s next president, filling a position that has been vacant since 2022. Aoun, currently commander of the military—and reportedly supported by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia—edged out Suleiman Frangiyeh, Hizballah’s preferred candidate. But while Aoun’s victory is a step in the right direction, David Daoud sounds a cautionary note:

Lebanon’s president lacks the constitutional authority to order Hizballah’s disarmament, and Aoun was elected as another “consensus president” with Hizballah’s votes. They wouldn’t vote for a man who would set in motion a process leading to their disarmament.

Habib Malik agrees that hoping for too much to come out of the election could constitute “daydreaming,” but he nonetheless believes the Lebanese have a chance to win their country back from Hizballah and, ultimately, make peace with Israel:

Lebanon’s 2019 economic collapse and the 2020 massive explosion at the Beirut Port were perpetrated by the ruling mafia, protected ever since by Hizballah. [But] Lebanon’s anti-Iran/Hizballah communities constitute a reliable partner for both the U.S. and Israel. The Lebanese are desperate to be rid of Iranian influence in order to pursue regional peace and prosperity with their neighbors. Suddenly, a unique opportunity for peace breaking out between Israel and Lebanon could be upon us, particularly given President Trump’s recent reelection with a landslide mandate. It was under Trump’s first term that the Abraham Accords came into being and so under his second term they could certainly be expanded.

As matters stand, Lebanon has very few major contentious issues with Israel. The precisely targeted and methodical nature of Israel’s war in Lebanon against Hizballah and what has unfolded in Syria make this outcome a far more attainable goal.