On October 31, the American envoy to Iran Robert Malley stated that the U.S. does not wish to “waste [its] time” pursuing a renewed nuclear deal with Tehran. Yet Washington has not formally broken off negotiations, nor has it invoked the “snapback” mechanism that would restore international sanctions to their pre-2015 state. David Albright and Henrik Rasmussen argue that, with public opinion turning against Iran due to its support for Russia and violent repression of protests, America and its European allies should do just that. But sanctions should only be the first step:

Second, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be empowered to investigate and monitor Iran’s nuclear program more fully. Today, Iran can produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in less than two weeks, and the IAEA has demonstrated Iran’s violations of its commitment to . . . declare its nuclear activities and maintain a purely peaceful nuclear program. Iran is steadfast in not cooperating with the inspectors, which suggests the regime is protecting a secret nuclear-weapons program and waiting for the right time to build nuclear weapons. . . . Iran’s noncooperation and violations of its safeguards agreement should lead to an IAEA Board of Governors’ referral to the UN Security Council, further isolating Iran.

Third, the West must develop a credible strategy of deterrence by denial, including robust missile-defense capabilities. These capabilities are woefully inadequate to confront Iran’s drone and missile fleets, whether in Ukraine, the eastern flank of NATO, or the Persian Gulf region.

Fourth, the Western powers should get serious about offensive military options to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran moves to divert nuclear material, kicks out the inspectors, withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or moves to build nuclear weapons.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.