A Catholic husband and wife, Kitty and Matthew Burke, are currently suing the state of Massachusetts after it rejected their application on the grounds that they “would not be affirming to a child who identified as LGBTQIA.” Tim Carney comments:

Massachusetts regulations dictate that all foster and adoptive parents must abide by the teachings of gender ideology, specifically the notion that children have an interior gender that is undetermined by their biological sex—and that children have the right to change their gender. . . . As the Burkes say in their complaint, this is “an absolute bar for Catholics who agree with the Church’s teaching on sex, marriage, and gender.”

When Washington state enforced similar regulations against a Seventh-day Adventist couple, a federal court blocked their enforcement, explaining that it was religious discrimination. . . . But calling these regulations religious discrimination doesn’t quite go far enough. Massachusetts and Washington didn’t merely create rules that discriminate against Catholics and Seventh-day Adventists. They discriminate against Muslims and Pentecostals too.

These state regulations also discriminate against secular, irreligious couples who do not believe that a boy who declares himself really a girl is actually a girl.

If you do not share this faith-based spirituality, Massachusetts believes you are not fit to adopt or foster children. Thus Massachusetts has once again established a state religion—one that happens to be harmful to children.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.