Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Tehran has increased its reserve of highly enriched uranium, making it that much closer to producing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the White House seems intent on negotiating an informal agreement that would exchange some $16 billion of sanctions relief for only an incremental slowing of nuclear progress—and that’s if the ayatollahs adhere to their end of the bargain. Andrea Stricker writes:

Washington is squandering valuable financial leverage while Iran expands its nuclear program—and the Biden administration is setting itself up for future extortion when the regime uses its nuclear program to demand more concessions.

Tehran, [for its part], did not comply with [the] reported administration demand that it cease deploying new sets of planned, faster centrifuges to enrich uranium. Iran installed one new set and still has thousands of the machines stockpiled or enriching. Moreover, despite Washington’s demand that Tehran cooperate with the IAEA on a separate inquiry into two sites where the regime allegedly carried out nuclear weapons work or stored related equipment, the IAEA reports there has been no progress.

These failures suggest not only that Iran remains motivated to continue covert nuclear-weapons work, but that it is unwilling to abide by the most basic of Biden’s terms.

The good news is that Congress can exercise its oversight rights to ascertain the extent of Washington’s understandings and sanctions-relief plans with Tehran. . . . Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), Congress can demand that the administration transmit for review any nuclear agreement, and the law defines “agreement” broadly enough to include informal or unwritten arrangements.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.