This is not the only difficult policy decision America currently faces with respect to Israel’s crisis. Although the topic of sanctions lacks the moral urgency of the safety of U.S. citizens in the hands of sadistic captors, it could in the long run prove no less consequential—and if mishandled, could lead to even greater losses of life. In accordance with the 2015 nuclear deal, UN sanctions on Iran’s drone and missile programs will expire on October 18. Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker argue that Washington must make sure the sanctions are renewed, and explain why doing so matters for Israel’s safety:

The expiration of the UN embargoes will make it easier for Iran to obtain foreign missile and drone equipment. Tehran already procures such equipment but will face fewer restrictions and enforcement actions to stop it from flowing from supplier and transit countries. Tehran will also increase its use of front companies and other concealment efforts to make illicit procurements for missile and drone activities more difficult to detect—and therefore harder for the U.S. and Europe to sanction.

Iran will use this new permissive procurement and sales environment to augment weapons provisions both to Palestinian terrorist groups that attack Israelis and to Russia to undermine Western support for Ukraine. . . . If the U.S. and its European partners rely solely on national authorities to retain the missile and drone sanctions [rather than renewing them at the UN], Iran will see it as a sign of Western weakness and intensify its malign activities, including its nuclear program.

When the West does not respond to Iran’s destabilizing policies in the region and beyond, Iran typically takes full advantage. Allowing the embargoes to lapse would be a further signal that the U.S. and Europe will stand down on Tehran’s drone, missile, and nuclear proliferation.

The U.S. and Europe have time to act and reverse their acquiescence to Tehran’s growing destabilization of international security. There isn’t a moment to lose—the people of Israel and Ukraine depend on it.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.