Europe Is Failing to Protect Its Jews

April 3 2024

Always a problem, violent anti-Semitism has gotten more frequent and more severe in Europe since October 7. European leaders have in many cases issued condemnations, and can point to various plans to combat anti-Semitism that their governments have approved in the past few years. But, argues Menachem Margolin, such steps have had “no visible or demonstrable practical application.”

Police departments are hamstrung in the face of openly anti-Semitic protests, unsure, and therefore unable, to stop public manifestations of hate. The courts, too, seem to have little to no framework available when it comes to prosecuting the anti-Zionists and anti-Semites who have made our collective Jewish life here in Europe hell.

The result? Jew haters are emboldened because they can act with impunity.

Today, the number-one cost for Jewish communities is security. Jews are largely on their own, footing the bill for private security and equipment—funds that could be used for Sunday schooling, community development, or holiday celebrations. I should also add here that the EU just put out a call for funding the security of Jewish institutions, but the bloc’s bureaucracy is often so cumbersome that—as one prominent rabbi put it—“it’s like asking someone to fill out a lengthy insurance form while your house is on fire.”

In short—and let me be blunt—if governments aren’t prepared, or are unwilling, to turn words into action . . . the entire strategy will be useless.

Read more at Politico

More about: Anti-Semitism, European Jewry

The U.S. Has Finally Turned Up the Heat on the Houthis—but Will It Be Enough?

March 17 2025

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Donald Trump, Houthis, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen