Shortly after Iran’s massive aerial attack on Israel on April 13, President Biden phoned Prime Minister Netanyahu and, reportedly, expressed his support for Israel while urging restraint. Why restraint? Fear of further escalation—which is what commentators warn of in virtually every tense moment in international relations.

In an insightful piece published on April 2, Peter Juul questions that instinct. He makes no mention of Israel, focusing instead on the war between Russia and Ukraine and the Iran-backed Houthis’ war on global shipping, but the relevance is clear:

Making escalation avoidance America’s top priority has proven especially damaging in Ukraine. To begin with, it’s resulted in a policy that almost always gives Kyiv the weapons it’s requested—whether Abrams tanks, F-16 fighters, or ATACMS missiles—too late to make the largest possible difference on the battlefield. . . . Each time the United States has crossed one of what American officials see as Putin’s redlines, moreover, the response from the Kremlin has been muted at worst. That strongly suggests that fears of escalation among American policymakers and analysts have been unfounded and unwarranted.

Likewise, the U.S. has been deliberately cautious in responding to the Houthi rebels in Yemen—and thus ineffective:

Suffice it to say that neither the Houthis themselves nor their Iranian patrons have de-escalated and do not fear that further attacks against commercial ships—or even U.S. Navy warships—will lead to escalation with the United States. In part, that’s because the current U.S.-led air campaign doesn’t really threaten anything the Houthis or their supporters in Tehran actually value.

First and foremost, policymakers and political leaders in Washington need to shift away from a mentality grounded on an inordinate, paralyzing fear that anything the United States might do will escalate a conflict. In too many cases—Ukraine most prominent and damaging to American interests among them—policymakers appear to live in terror of crossing redlines that largely exist in their own minds.

Likewise, the idea that American policymakers can manage escalation in conflicts with their own logic thousands of miles away needs to go. . . . Ultimately, American policymakers and political leaders need to recognize that “escalation management” isn’t an end in itself.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.