Shortly after Iran’s massive aerial attack on Israel on April 13, President Biden phoned Prime Minister Netanyahu and, reportedly, expressed his support for Israel while urging restraint. Why restraint? Fear of further escalation—which is what commentators warn of in virtually every tense moment in international relations.

In an insightful piece published on April 2, Peter Juul questions that instinct. He makes no mention of Israel, focusing instead on the war between Russia and Ukraine and the Iran-backed Houthis’ war on global shipping, but the relevance is clear:

Making escalation avoidance America’s top priority has proven especially damaging in Ukraine. To begin with, it’s resulted in a policy that almost always gives Kyiv the weapons it’s requested—whether Abrams tanks, F-16 fighters, or ATACMS missiles—too late to make the largest possible difference on the battlefield. . . . Each time the United States has crossed one of what American officials see as Putin’s redlines, moreover, the response from the Kremlin has been muted at worst. That strongly suggests that fears of escalation among American policymakers and analysts have been unfounded and unwarranted.

Likewise, the U.S. has been deliberately cautious in responding to the Houthi rebels in Yemen—and thus ineffective:

Suffice it to say that neither the Houthis themselves nor their Iranian patrons have de-escalated and do not fear that further attacks against commercial ships—or even U.S. Navy warships—will lead to escalation with the United States. In part, that’s because the current U.S.-led air campaign doesn’t really threaten anything the Houthis or their supporters in Tehran actually value.

First and foremost, policymakers and political leaders in Washington need to shift away from a mentality grounded on an inordinate, paralyzing fear that anything the United States might do will escalate a conflict. In too many cases—Ukraine most prominent and damaging to American interests among them—policymakers appear to live in terror of crossing redlines that largely exist in their own minds.

Likewise, the idea that American policymakers can manage escalation in conflicts with their own logic thousands of miles away needs to go. . . . Ultimately, American policymakers and political leaders need to recognize that “escalation management” isn’t an end in itself.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.