In legal philosophy and theory, a foundational debate exists between proponents of “legal formalism” and “legal realism.” Haym Soloveitchik, a leading historian of medieval halakhah, explains the positions thus:

The formalists contend that the judge only applies the rules of the system to a specific case, while the realists contend that, in the final analysis, the judge rules, be it only unconsciously, in accordance with his personal and ideological inclinations.

In other words, formalists believe judges first decide how they want to rule—often based on political goals—and then marshal the law to support their position. Which, then, best describes Jewish law? Soloveitchik first encountered the question as a student in the 1960s, when he first read, “with excitement,” the works of the realists:

I realized that, [if the realists were right], the mode of argument in [the talmudic tractates dealing with civil law], which are goal-oriented, would differ fundamentally from most arguments in the [tractates devoted to ritual law]. . . . I was unable to discover such a difference in my yeshivah days and have not succeeded in discovering it in all the intervening years, and not for lack of trying. Indeed, I would say that I have turned repeatedly to this problem over the course of my academic career.

This conclusion, in turn, leads Soloveitchik to a defense of reason itself: in the long run, it doesn’t matter what motivated Rabbi Moses Maimonides or Chief Justice John Marshall to rule a certain way, what allows their opinions to endure is that logical reasoning each used in support of his respective positions:

Many of Marshall’s greatest decisions had a clear political purpose, [which was] part and parcel of the agenda of the Federalist party to which he belonged. . . . Yet, because of their power and cogency, they carried the day. . . . Judges are deemed great and their decisions read and held binding because of the force of their arguments, arguments which have held, at times, for centuries.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.