In legal philosophy and theory, a foundational debate exists between proponents of “legal formalism” and “legal realism.” Haym Soloveitchik, a leading historian of medieval halakhah, explains the positions thus:

The formalists contend that the judge only applies the rules of the system to a specific case, while the realists contend that, in the final analysis, the judge rules, be it only unconsciously, in accordance with his personal and ideological inclinations.

In other words, formalists believe judges first decide how they want to rule—often based on political goals—and then marshal the law to support their position. Which, then, best describes Jewish law? Soloveitchik first encountered the question as a student in the 1960s, when he first read, “with excitement,” the works of the realists:

I realized that, [if the realists were right], the mode of argument in [the talmudic tractates dealing with civil law], which are goal-oriented, would differ fundamentally from most arguments in the [tractates devoted to ritual law]. . . . I was unable to discover such a difference in my yeshivah days and have not succeeded in discovering it in all the intervening years, and not for lack of trying. Indeed, I would say that I have turned repeatedly to this problem over the course of my academic career.

This conclusion, in turn, leads Soloveitchik to a defense of reason itself: in the long run, it doesn’t matter what motivated Rabbi Moses Maimonides or Chief Justice John Marshall to rule a certain way, what allows their opinions to endure is that logical reasoning each used in support of his respective positions:

Many of Marshall’s greatest decisions had a clear political purpose, [which was] part and parcel of the agenda of the Federalist party to which he belonged. . . . Yet, because of their power and cogency, they carried the day. . . . Judges are deemed great and their decisions read and held binding because of the force of their arguments, arguments which have held, at times, for centuries.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.