The section of the Mishneh Torah—Moses Maimonides’ compendium of talmudic law—titled Hilkhot T’shuvah, or the Laws of Repentance, is one of Judaism’s most profound works of moral theology. In the fourth chapter of this section, Maimonides enumerates and examines 24 sinful behaviors that “prevent repentance,” drawn from the work of the 11th-century North African sage Isaac Alfasi (a/k/a the Rif). Alan Jotkowitz subjects this passage to a close reading:

Alfasi simply lists 24 items that hold back t’shuvah. Maimonides rearranged the list, divided the items into five categories, explained why each holds back t’shuvah, and added the crucial caveat that “All of the above, and other similar transgressions, though they hold back repentance, do not prevent it entirely.”

The first thing one notices, [upon closer examination], is that the majority of the sins in all five categories are . . . between man and his fellow man, such as causing others to sin, or not returning lost objects. The few sins that on the surface don’t seem to fit into this paradigm have an interpersonal aspect as well. For example, the sin of gazing at someone’s private parts is certainly a sin between man and God, but it is also treating another human being as an object. In fact, the theme of the whole chapter is the relationship between the community and the t’shuvah of the individual. Indeed, the only word repeated in the entire chapter is kahal (community). . . .

The theme of the chapter is that a person does not live on an island and needs the help of friends, teachers, and community to do t’shuvah. But one also needs the help of God, as He is also part of the community. [By the same token, if] you cause other people in the community to sin, God won’t help you repent.

Repentance has traditionally been viewed as a solitary experience of the individual standing before his or her Creator, but the crucial theme of the chapter is the vital role community can play in this process.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.