The section of the Mishneh Torah—Moses Maimonides’ compendium of talmudic law—titled Hilkhot T’shuvah, or the Laws of Repentance, is one of Judaism’s most profound works of moral theology. In the fourth chapter of this section, Maimonides enumerates and examines 24 sinful behaviors that “prevent repentance,” drawn from the work of the 11th-century North African sage Isaac Alfasi (a/k/a the Rif). Alan Jotkowitz subjects this passage to a close reading:

Alfasi simply lists 24 items that hold back t’shuvah. Maimonides rearranged the list, divided the items into five categories, explained why each holds back t’shuvah, and added the crucial caveat that “All of the above, and other similar transgressions, though they hold back repentance, do not prevent it entirely.”

The first thing one notices, [upon closer examination], is that the majority of the sins in all five categories are . . . between man and his fellow man, such as causing others to sin, or not returning lost objects. The few sins that on the surface don’t seem to fit into this paradigm have an interpersonal aspect as well. For example, the sin of gazing at someone’s private parts is certainly a sin between man and God, but it is also treating another human being as an object. In fact, the theme of the whole chapter is the relationship between the community and the t’shuvah of the individual. Indeed, the only word repeated in the entire chapter is kahal (community). . . .

The theme of the chapter is that a person does not live on an island and needs the help of friends, teachers, and community to do t’shuvah. But one also needs the help of God, as He is also part of the community. [By the same token, if] you cause other people in the community to sin, God won’t help you repent.

Repentance has traditionally been viewed as a solitary experience of the individual standing before his or her Creator, but the crucial theme of the chapter is the vital role community can play in this process.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.