Debating Mussolini's Jewish Mistress

Nov. 24 2014

There is little doubt that Benito Mussolini’s Venetian-born Jewish lover Margherita Sarfatti had a profound influence on the dictator’s career, but can she truly be called the “godmother of fascism,” as her biographer Brian R. Sullivan claims? Or did her contribution consist mainly of “smooth[ing] off the rough edges of Mussolini’s persona at the start of his political ascent to power,” as Michael McDonald argues? To McDonald, the question pivots not only on the correct interpretation of Sarfatti’s persona but also on the nature of fascism itself:

Sarfatti was less of an intellectual than a cultural impresario and spin doctor. Even if she had been an intellectual who had played a crucial role in conceptualizing fascism—which she wasn’t—it still would be wrong of Brian Sullivan to overstate her importance, as he does. I say this because I happen to agree with Robert Paxton that “fascism was an affair of the gut more than of the brain, and a study of the roots of fascism that treats only the thinkers and the writers misses the most powerful influences of all.” A study that treats only a “thinker” such as Sarfatti misses even more. To quote Paxton again, “fascism is more plausibly linked to a set of ‘mobilizing passions’ that shape fascist action than to a consistent and fully articulated philosophy.” As one fascist militant declared in 1920: “The fist is the synthesis of our theory.”

Read more at American Interest

More about: Benito Mussolini, Fascism, Italian Jewry, Margherita Sarfatti

 

Israel’s Strategic Gamble in Lebanon

Nov. 13 2024

Yesterday, Hizballah fired over 80 rockets into Israel, one of which killed two civilians in the city of Nahariya. Further disaster was narrowly avoided when one of the terrorist group’s attack drones exploded near a kindergarten in Haifa, from which children had been evacuated just in the nick of time. Iran’s Lebanese proxy thus continues to demonstrate that, battered though it may be, it can still do considerable damage, although it has not been able to carry out the overwhelming and devastating barrages that Israeli experts once feared.

Eran Ortal examines the progress of Israel’s Third Lebanon War, assessing that the IDF’s goal is not to encircle and destroy Hizballah’s military forces, but to destroy its infrastructure while avoiding combat. Ortal considers the merits of this approach:

Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hizballah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hizballah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.

The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we [Israelis] have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hizballah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits.

If Israel does find itself preparing for another round of conflict, Ortal goes on to argue, it must be ready for a military confrontation, not a counterterrorism operation.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Hizballah, Israeli Security, Lebanon