In the recent elections, Democratic candidates garnered a somewhat smaller-than-usual percentage of Jewish votes. One interpretation of these results not only distorts them drastically but reflects an increasingly misguided mindset about the necessary affinity between Jews and liberalism. Seth Mandel writes:

Just as Darron Smith [in the Huffington Post] thinks blacks who don’t vote for Democrats are in some way voting against their “blackness,” and Ann Friedman [in New York Magazine] can write that Republican women aren’t “truly pro-woman,” the idea undergirding [Emma] Green’s conclusion [in the Atlantic] is that liberalism is political Judaism. That’s insulting to those who take their Jewish faith seriously, and . . . it’s also, crucially, wrong. There has been no major swing of the Jewish vote away from Democrats, and there likely won’t be. But incremental gains [of Jewish votes] by the GOP are not evidence of Jews being less Jewish; they’re exactly the opposite. . . . [Green’s] analysis is just one more example that modern liberalism requires its adherents to sacrifice all other aspects of their identity for The Cause.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.