There is little mystery about the motivations behind terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians: the perpetrators do not seek to create a Palestinian state, but to destroy the Jewish one. Although Congress does not have the power to stop terrorism, it can take steps to prevent the U.S. government from encouraging it, argues William Kristol:

Americans and the members of Congress who represent them should ask: what is the reason for further delaying the move of the American embassy to Jerusalem, the capital of Israel since 1948? What is the rationale for the State Department not recognizing Israel as the land of your birth if you’re born in West Jerusalem? Why shouldn’t at least some of the aid to Abbas’s Palestinian Authority be suspended and made contingent on their stopping incitement against Israelis and Jews? Why should U.S. taxpayers continue sending money to the Palestinian Authority as long as that entity continues to provide funds to support the families of terrorists? . . .

Congress can’t bring about “peace” between Israel and its enemies. But it can help bring about relative quiet and stability. One way it can do so is to tell the administration to stop making things worse with the “peace process,” which has become a terror process. An obsession with the “peace process” encourages Palestinians and their backers around the world to think that with a little more pressure—ranging from terror to boycotts—Israel can be forced to make concessions. But having pulled out of Gaza, and having tried time and again to respect Palestinian wishes and demands (God forbid Jews should intone prayers themselves on the Temple Mount!), Israel is not now going to make further concessions under pressure. Nor should it.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.