The recent visit of a delegation of Saudi notables to Israel has raised hopes that the two countries might establish diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future. Likely or not, such a development would presumably give Jews access to historic sites in the Arabian peninsula, once home to a Jewish population predating the time of Muhammad. Jessica Steinberg writes:

[I]n the 6th and 7th centuries, there was a considerable Jewish population in Hejaz, mostly around [the cities of] Medina, Khaybar, and Tayma. . . .

The medieval Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela, during an 1165 to 1173 trek, [reported visiting thriving] Jewish communities in [what is now] Saudi Arabia. . . .

[T]he Khaybar Fortress, perched on a hill overlooking the oasis, is at least 1,400 years old. . . . It was Mohammed’s nephew and son-in-law, Ali, who was able to unlock the gate of the fortress to allow the Muslim armies to . . . conquer it. It was rebuilt and reused several times, but is still usually referred to it as the “Fortress of the Jews.”

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.