The recent visit of a delegation of Saudi notables to Israel has raised hopes that the two countries might establish diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future. Likely or not, such a development would presumably give Jews access to historic sites in the Arabian peninsula, once home to a Jewish population predating the time of Muhammad. Jessica Steinberg writes:

[I]n the 6th and 7th centuries, there was a considerable Jewish population in Hejaz, mostly around [the cities of] Medina, Khaybar, and Tayma. . . .

The medieval Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela, during an 1165 to 1173 trek, [reported visiting thriving] Jewish communities in [what is now] Saudi Arabia. . . .

[T]he Khaybar Fortress, perched on a hill overlooking the oasis, is at least 1,400 years old. . . . It was Mohammed’s nephew and son-in-law, Ali, who was able to unlock the gate of the fortress to allow the Muslim armies to . . . conquer it. It was rebuilt and reused several times, but is still usually referred to it as the “Fortress of the Jews.”

In a sense, the most successful negotiation with Hamas was the recent agreement securing the release of Edan Alexander, the last living hostage with a U.S. passport. Unlike those previously handed over, he wasn’t exchanged for Palestinian prisoners, and there was no cease-fire. Dan Diker explains what Hamas got out of the deal:

Alexander’s unconditional release [was] designed to legitimize Hamas further as a viable negotiator and to keep Hamas in power, particularly at a moment when Israel is expanding its military campaign to conquer Gaza and eliminate Hamas as a military, political, and civil power. Israel has no other option than defeating Hamas. Hamas’s “humanitarian” move encourages American pressure on Israel to end its counterterrorism war in service of advancing additional U.S. efforts to release hostages over time, legitimizing Hamas while it rearms, resupplies, and reestablishes it military power and control.

In fact, Hamas-affiliated media have claimed credit for successful negotiations with the U.S., branding the release of Edan Alexander as the “Edan deal,” portraying Hamas as a rising international player, sidelining Israel from direct talks with DC, and declaring this a “new phase in the conflict.”

Fortunately, however, Washington has not coerced Jerusalem into ceasing the war since Alexander’s return. Nor, Diker observes, did the deal drive a wedge between the two allies, despite much speculation about the possibility.