In a wide-ranging interview, the historian Jonathan Sarna discusses American Jews’ relationship with Israel, the changing role of the major denominations, the recent presidential election, and whether U.S. Jewry will maintain its long-standing alliance with the Democratic party. (Interview by Dror Eydar.)

The truth is that anyone who studies Jewish history knows that the extremes on both sides are dangerous for Jews. Very often, there is a convergence of the extreme left and extreme right. My concern is that this election has given certain fodder to the extremes. Hillary Clinton was trying to find a more centrist path. The failure of that path has led some elements in her party to say that this was a big mistake, and that they should have run a campaign aimed at the Bernie Sanders wing of the Democratic party, which would have focused on real change, and would have succeeded, in their opinion. I am not sure that is true. Those people, whether you are talking about Sanders or Senator Elizabeth Warren or Representative Keith Ellison, are very [hostile] toward Israel, although some of their domestic proposals find favor in the eyes of many American Jews.

It will be very interesting to see four years from now which wing of the Democratic party wins. I would not be surprised if the somewhat anti-Israel left-wing rises. Then it would be very interesting to see which Jews say they absolutely cannot vote for its candidates and which Jews say, “I am an American citizen and I better agree with the domestic policies of these candidates. Nor am I fond of Israel’s policies.”

I expect that Jews would tend in both directions. I would be very surprised if in the 21st century the Jewish community is as strongly Democratic as it has been for the 80 years or so since Al Smith, [the Democratic nominee who lost the 1928 elections to Herbert Hoover]. My guess is that in the years ahead, we will see a voting pattern among Jews similar to that of the 19th century, when everybody understood that the Jews were divided politically and that they were also willing to shift back and forth depending on the candidate.

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.