More than a half-year after Donald Trump took office, there is still speculation over whether his administration will jettison the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But, argue Eric Edelman and Charles Wald, this discussion is of secondary importance. The task for the White House is to devise a policy to prevent the Islamic Republic from getting nuclear weapons—something that a “dangerous deal that puts the U.S. in an impossible situation” failed to accomplish.

The Trump administration’s priority should be restoring leverage against Tehran . . . The first step is full enforcement of the JCPOA—including potentially re-imposing suspended sanctions in response to Iranian cheating—as a clear signal that Iran can no longer flout its nuclear obligations. . . .

American policymakers must also rebuild military leverage over Iran. Contingency plans to neutralize Iran’s nuclear facilities, if it materially breaches or withdraws from the deal, should be updated to reflect its growing nuclear infrastructure and military capabilities under the JCPOA. Just as it already appears to be doing against North Korea, the Pentagon must also develop credible capabilities in preparation for a possible shoot-down of future Iranian ballistic-missile tests. U.S. Navy ships must also . . . utilize rules of engagement to defend themselves and the Persian Gulf against rising Iranian harassment.

It is equally important that the United States work with its allies. The recent ten-year Memorandum of Understanding on defense assistance to Israel should be treated as the floor for cooperation, in particular on missile defenses shielding U.S. forces, Israel, and its neighbors from increasingly capable arsenals of Iran and its proxies. . . .

These concentric pressures—none of which violates the JCPOA—will help deter Iran from pursuing nuclear-weapons capability whether it complies, violates, or withdraws from the deal.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.