With Barack Obama’s presidency coming to a close, Amos Yadlin offers some suggestions for repairing the damaged relationship between Washington and Jerusalem. One of the most important issues to be addressed is Iran; another is Israeli settlements:

Iran poses the greatest threat to Israel in the long term, and a nuclear-armed Iran poses a threat to the United States and to world peace. . . . An effort should be made to conclude a parallel U.S.-Israeli agreement that reflects the two countries’ mutual understandings and commitments regarding the achievement of a significant reduction in the dangers posed by the nuclear agreement, as well as joint measures to contend with its serious long-term implications and significantly to strengthen long-term Israeli security. . . .

It will also be important for Israel to try to reach an agreement whereby the United States would provide Israel with all the operational capabilities necessary to take action against Iran—in the event that all other alternatives for halting Iran’s progress toward completing its nuclear program have been exhausted. . . .

A necessary initial step [regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict] would be a renewal of the understanding articulated in George W. Bush’s 2004 letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. . . . Such an agreement would significantly reduce the tension surrounding the issue of the settlements, which has poisoned U.S.-Israel relations over the past eight years. In this context, it is important to work with the outgoing administration to prevent UN Security Council resolutions regarding plans for an Israel-Palestinian permanent agreement that are formulated without coordination with the Israeli government and against its policy, as [such a resolution] would leave Israel with no negotiating cards for the future.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.