In 2014, the British city of Leicester decided to boycott some Israeli products; the city council of Lancaster adopted a similar resolution in 2021. On Monday, the House of Commons voted in favor of advancing a bill that would stop such actions by local governments. The vote followed the bill’s second reading, which means those who object to its particulars could have voted for it, and then sought to have it amended before it is considered for passage. Nonetheless, the entire Labor party and 84 Tories abstained, while 70 MPs voted against it. Melanie Phillips comments:

The opposition to the bill is deeply disingenuous. Critics say that it’s so wide-ranging, it will prevent boycotts of places like China or Russia. Yet exemptions would permit boycotts of those countries. . . . Not once . . . did any of these critics acknowledge the malevolent use of libelous falsehoods against Israel, nor the BDS strategy of annihilation.

No less stomach-turning was the handwringing concern that the bill would promote anti-Semitism. Dame Margaret Hodge, known for her unremitting attacks on Israeli policies but who declared herself to be a “proud Zionist,” said the bill “plays into the hands of anti-Semites” by singling out Israel “as the one place that can never be boycotted.” This was beyond perverse, [as well as inaccurate].

The claim that the bill will foment anti-Semitism echoes those in the Jewish community who say any robust defense of Israel foments anti-Semitism. What Hodge and her ilk are actually doing is weaponizing anti-Semitism against Israel.

The number of Tories opposed to it is dismaying. As for Labor, Britain’s Jewish community leadership seems to think it’s safe to support the party once again because its inner viper of Israel-bashing Jew-hatred has been decapitated. Such a judgment would appear to be distinctly premature.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.