The Iran problem is also at the heart of whether the Israel-Hamas war will torpedo normalization between Jerusalem and Riyadh. While there is reason to believe that the terrorists launched their assault with that goal in mind, John Hannah and Blaise Misztal don’t believe it is an inevitable outcome. The Saudi crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman (known as MBS) has indeed halted the normalization process, but he might also resume it after the fighting ends:

Prior to October 7, MBS thought he was moving into alignment with an Israel whose deterrent power was overwhelming and whose military was the most competent in the Middle East. Hamas’s slaughter blasted a hole in that assumption. Instead, it’s the kingdom’s most dangerous foe, Iran and its terrorist allies, that appear ascendant and capable of inflicting massive harm on all those who defy them.

Whether MBS’s pause turns into long-term postponement now depends critically on . . . Israel’s success in reestablishing its deterrent power by crushing Hamas’s military capabilities in Gaza while limiting, to the extent possible, the impact on Palestinian civilians. When the dust finally settles, what needs to be clear is that Hamas’s so-called victory of October 7 was at best short-lived and Pyrrhic, ultimately resulting in a devastating defeat for both the terror group and its Iranian sponsors.

Specifically, MBS must come away reassured that his original thesis for normalization—one based on a combination of overwhelming Israeli power and American security guarantees—remains the best bet for securing the kingdom’s future stability and prosperity. Achieving that outcome depends first and foremost on Israel, of course. But it won’t happen without the kind of unequivocal U.S. backing that Biden has superbly provided since the crisis erupted.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.