While the Biden administration has perhaps been more supportive of Israel’s efforts than Hamas expected, it decided on Tuesday not to stop the release of $10 billions dollars in withheld funds to Hamas’s patrons in Tehran. Surely the best way to prolong the fighting in Gaza would be to fund both sides—but that is precisely what the White House has opted to do. Richard Goldberg writes:

The Biden administration argues that the $10 billion sanctions relief is not significant since Iran will be restricted to using the funds for “humanitarian” or “non-sanctioned” purposes only. The administration used this same argument to defend the transfer of $6 billion of Tehran’s assets in September from South Korea to Qatar. Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill both rejected the administration’s claim because money is fungible. If the regime receives billions to cover non-sanctioned expenditures, that frees up an equivalent amount for illicit programs. Iran also has a long track record of processing phony humanitarian transactions for illicit purposes.

In the wake of October 7 and non-stop Iran-directed attacks on U.S. forces in the Middle East, Congress should swiftly enact legislation that freezes all cash made available in Iraq, France, Germany, Oman, and Qatar and all other accounts where Iranian funds are held.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.