Since 2013, the IDF has carried out hundreds, if not thousands, of airstrikes in Syria, targeting military installations, transports, and infrastructure belonging to Iran, its proxy Hizballah, and the regime of Bashar al-Assad himself. None of its planes have been shot down, and attempts at retaliation have generally fallen flat, and failed to deter. Eran Lerman responds to the argument that, despite this apparent success, this “War Between Wars” has failed to achieve its strategic ends:

The Iranians do have a significant presence and a number of training bases in Syria and may yet seek to expand their presence. On the other hand, an Iranian stronghold in Syria had not materialized to date as envisioned. Specifically, the “precision project” as Israelis call it—Iran’s effort to supply Hizballah with terminal guidance systems for its large arsenal of medium-range missiles aimed at Israel—was disrupted and delayed again and again.

My assessment is an interim one—to date Israel is preventing Iran from building a base for itself in Syria. But as both sides escalate their military responses, there is the danger of triggering the confrontation that both Israel and Lebanese Hizballah have been careful to avoid for seventeen years.

James Jeffrey provides a complementary view of the same question from an American perspective:

The surprise is not that Assad has escaped disaster but that, even after the last two plus years of indifferent American Syria policy, he has not won. That situation, owing in part to Israeli actions, still provides an opportunity for the U.S., Israel, and other actors together to shape a final Syria outcome to advance regional security. In short, the Syria conflict isn’t over yet.

Israel’s air operations, supported by the U.S. beginning in 2018, and coordinated informally with other military pressure on the Assad regime, have helped freeze the conflict.

And, Jeffrey observes, a frozen conflict, with all its problems, is far preferable to a clear victory by Assad and his Iranian and Russian backers.

The editors of the Wall Street Journal rightly call the Biden administration’s new policy an arms embargo. (Subscription required.)

The administration would like to focus on the denial of 2,000-pound bombs, which it says are too destructive. Never mind that a professional force can employ them in a manner that restricts the radius of damage. Mr. Biden is also halting a shipment of 500-pound bombs and holding up Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), which convert unguided bombs into precision “smart” bombs. Politico reports that small-diameter bombs are being withheld. The Journal adds that the Biden administration has been sitting on a deal that includes tank shells and mortar rounds.

The message from the White House, in other words, is that Israel shouldn’t have large bombs or small bombs, dumb bombs or smart bombs, and let it do without tanks and artillery too. Now isn’t a good time to send the weapons, you see, because Israel would use them.

But it’s even worse than that: withholding the JDAMs in effect encourages Israel to use dumb bombs in instances when precision weapons would be more effective, and less likely to cause harm to bystanders. And then there is the twisted logic behind the decision:

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other U.S. officials explain that the goal of the embargo—which they present as a “pause” or “review”—is to prevent a wider Israeli attack on the Hamas stronghold of Rafah. This is the terrorists’ reward for using civilians as human shields.

It hasn’t been four weeks since Iran attacked Israel directly, in the largest drone attack in history, plus 150 or so ballistic and cruise missiles. . . . Israel needs to be ready now, and its enemies need to know the U.S. stands behind it.