In 1555, Pope Paul IV ordered Jews to be confined to separate, closed-off neighborhoods. Soon ghettos appeared in cities throughout Italy, including Rome, where Jews were forced to live within the walls until the French Revolution. Italian archivist Giancarlo Spizzichino recently discovered the existence of a second ghetto, known as Ghettarello, in Rome. The Holy See closed it down in 1735—in an outburst not of tolerance but of intolerance, as Micol Debash writes:

The Papal State had a number of reasons to close the Ghettarello. For one, it was under financial stress, which could be partially alleviated by selling the ghetto buildings. Also, the Pope needed to fight against the tendencies of the Enlightenment, where an appeal to reason was favored over faith. Anti-Jewish regulation and legislation were starting to be repealed: the Pope . . . felt threatened by these changes and for his part became even more severe. . . . “Closing the Ghettarello was one of the many acts of the Papal State to put pressure on the Jews in order to force them to give up on their religion and identity,” explained Spizzichino.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.